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Economic and Industrial Democracy
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Variable Pay and Collective Bargaining: A Cross-National Comparison of the Banking Sector

Franz Traxler

University of Vienna

Jim Arrowsmith

University of Warwick

Kristine Nergaard

Fafo (Institute for Labour and Social Research in Oslo)

Joaquim M. Molins López-Rodó

Autonomous University of Barcelona

This article analyses the challenge of variable pay to collective bargaining, based on a cross-national comparison that takes banking organizations in Austria, Norway, Spain and the UK as representatives of Europe's principal bargaining systems. The hypothesis is that the capacity of collective bargaining to govern variable pay varies with the bargaining system. As the findings show, articulated multi-employer bargaining is more able to govern variable pay than its unarticulated counterpart and single-employer bargaining. Within the case of articulated multi-employer bargaining, single-channel systems of employee workplace representation are superior to dual systems, all the more since the former equip the unions with selective incentives for membership.

Key Words: employee workplace representation • multi-employer bargaining • organized decentralization • pay flexibility • single-employer bargaining

Economic and Industrial Democracy, Vol. 29, No. 3, 406-431 (2008)
DOI: 10.1177/0143831X08093376
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[Abstract] [PDF]